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BORN TO RUN: THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY IN STATE v. PANG
Timothy McMichael
Abstract: The Supreme Court of Washington's decision in State v. Pang that Martin Pang
could not be tried for murder involved an erroneous application of the doctrine of specialty. This
Note contends that this decision was based upon the court's overly broad reading of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rauscher. The Supreme Court of Washington
implied terms into the extradition treaty because of the court's incorrect interpretation of
Rauscher, which prevented Washington from prosecuting Pang for murder. In addition, the court
failed to take into account the policy rationales behind the doctrine of specialty, which favors
allowing the State to prosecute Pang for murder. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court of
Washington misread the terms of the US.-Brazil extradition treaty, and Washington had the right
to prosecute Pang for murder.
A fire broke out at the Mary Pang Food Products warehouse in south
Seattle on January 5, 1995.1 The blaze, which was declared an arson,2 took
the lives of four firefighters.3 The fire at the Pang warehouse was the
biggest tragedy in the Seattle Fire Department's history.4 In an arson
investigation, Mr. Martin Pang, son of the warehouse owners, became the
main suspect.5 Pang fled to Brazil, and the United States immediately
sought to have him extradited back to the State of Washington for trial on
the charges of arson and four counts of murder.6 The Supreme Court of
Brazil granted an order of extradition for Pang, but only for the single count
of arson.7 The tragic and unnecessary loss of four lives in the fire, the
cowardly but dramatic escape from U.S. borders to Brazil, and Brazil's
absolute refusal to extradite Pang for the four counts of murder brought
state and national attention to the situation.8
1. State v. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d 852,856,940 P.2d 1293, 1295, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 628 (1997).
2. Id. at 865, 940 P.2d at 1300.
3. Id.
4. Dan Raley & Ellis E. Conklin, "Get The Heck Out ofHere!" Federal Team Will Probe Cause of
Fire, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 7, 1995, at Al.
5. James Wallace & Dan Raley, Martin Pang: Playboy with a Violent Life, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Feb. 15, 1995, at Al.
6. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 859, 940 P.2d at 1297.
7. Id. at 873, 940 P.2d at 1304.
8. Dan Raley & James Wallace, Pang Is Arrested in Brazil: Suspect in Arson Deaths Did Not Resist,
Police Say, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 17, 1995, at Al.
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Upon receiving Pang from Brazil, Washington ignored the Brazilian
order and proceeded to prosecute Pang for arson and the four counts of
murder.9 Pang challenged the State's decision to prosecute him on the latter
counts but failed at the trial court level.' Pang appealed this decision
directly to the Supreme Court of Washington." The court held that the
doctrine of specialty prevented the State from trying Pang for any offense
not listed in the extradition order issued by Brazil. 2 Under the doctrine of
specialty, a state that receives a defendant by way of extradition can
normally only prosecute the person for the offenses for which the sending
state surrendered him. 3 The terms of each specific extradition treaty can
expand or limit the protection afforded a defendant. 4 Applying the specialty
doctrine, the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted the U.S.-Brazil
treaty as preventing the receiving state from prosecuting Pang for any
offenses beyond those listed in the extradition order."
This Note urges that the Supreme Court of Washington misread the
U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty and misapplied the doctrine of specialty in
this case. The court should have allowed the State to prosecute Pang for
both arson and the four counts of murder. The scope of the protection
provided under the doctrine of specialty is determined by the terms of the
extradition treaty between the two countries." In this case, the terms of the
U.S.-Brazil treaty provided Pang with less protection than is accorded a
defendant under some versions of specialty. 7 The treaty specifically allows
the receiving state to control the scope of prosecution by way of the
offenses that are listed in the request for extradition. 8 The Supreme Court
of Washington implied increased protection into the treaty and incorrectly
9. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 888-89, 940 P.2d at 1312.
10. Id. at 890-91, 940 P.2d at 1312-13.
11. Id. at 893, 940 P.2d at 1314.
12. Id. at 915, 940 P.2d at 1325.
13. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 429
(3d ed. 1996).
14. Kenneth E. Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and Effective Treaty
Enforcement, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1017, 1026 (1992).
15. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 915, 940 P.2d at 1325.
16. United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
17. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 918, 940 P.2d at 1327 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
18. The Treaty provides that "[a] person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be tried
or punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior to the request for his
extradition, other than that which gave rise to the request." Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 13, 1961, U.S.-
Braz., art XXI, 15 U.S.T. 2093.
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prevented Washington from prosecuting Pang for an offense that was within
the parameters of the treaty.
Part I of this Note discusses the extradition process and how the doctrine
of specialty fits into it. Part II provides a summary of the facts making up
the case against Martin Pang and discusses the majority and dissenting
opinions in State v. Pang. Finally, Part I argues that the Supreme Court of
Washington misapplied the doctrine of specialty in the Pang case. The plain
meaning of the treaty's terms gave the State of Washington the power to
prosecute Pang for both arson and murder, therefore, the court should have
allowed the State to prosecute Pang for both crimes.
I. EXTRADITION AND THE SPECIALTY DOCTRINE
A. Extradition Treaties
The United States uses the process of extradition19 to obtain jurisdiction
over the vast majority of defendants located outside its territorial reach."
Extradition is defined as the "surrender by one nation to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory,
and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent
to try and to punish him, demands the surrender."'
Generally, countries gain access to defendants located outside their
borders through extradition treaties with one another.' An extradition
treaty' is an agreement between two governments to cooperate in the
19. A duty to extradite individuals is not recognized as a part of international law. See Bassiouni,
supra note 13, at 383. However, countries do have an international legal duty to surrender fugitives from
justice in cases involving international crimes. See generally id. at 8-11.
20. M. CherifBassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order,
36 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (1968). Congress enacted legislation that requires the extradition of fugitives
from the United States be pursuant to a treaty. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1994). However, these statutes
do not preclude the United States from requesting that a country return a fugitive to the United States
in the absence of a treaty. See Bassiouni, supra, at 34.
21. Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
22. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 6. States also can surrender fugitives on the basis of reciprocity or
international comity, both of which are based on principles of friendly cooperation among nations, but
neither of which is legally binding on any country. See generally id. at 17-18.
23. The term "extradition treaty" includes bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties, multilateral treaties
containing an extradition clause, military rendition agreements, and treaties for the transfer of offenders
containing a return clause. See idl at 49. Today, the United States relies almost exclusively on bilateral
extradition treaties as the legal basis for requests for extradition. It also can rely on multilateral treaties,
reciprocity, comity, and national legislation. See id. at 34.
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exchange and prosecution of criminal suspects and convicted criminals.24
Countries enter into extradition treaties because of a mutual desire to
suppress crime and ensure that criminals are not using territorial boundaries
as shields from prosecution.25 An extradition treaty between countries
imposes a legal duty upon the parties to the treaty to extradite individuals
in a manner consistent with the treaty's terms.26 The United States relies
heavily on extradition treaties27 to acquire jurisdiction over defendants
located outside its territorial reach.2"
B. The Mechanics of Extradition
A country must follow several steps to extradite an individual pursuant
to a treaty. The country seeking to extradite (requesting country) must make
a formal request to the country where the individual is located (surrendering
country).29 This formal request must include the complaint upon which the
arrest was made.30 The complaint lists the facts underlying the crimes for
which the defendant is charged and specifically includes the offenses for
which the requesting country seeks to prosecute the individual.3 '
After receiving the formal request for extradition, the surrendering
country holds an extradition hearing.32 The extradition treaty generally
contains a list of offenses for which both countries agree extradition may be
granted.33 At the hearing, the surrendering country looks at the offenses
with which the suspect is charged and determines: (1) whether the offenses
are extraditable under the terms of the treaty, (2) whether "probable cause"
24. Id. at 384.
25. Id. at 4 ("Thus extradition, which at one time had manifested itself as a practice designed for the
preservation of the political and religious interests of states..., evolved into an international means of
cooperation in the suppression of criminality.").
26. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1991); see also
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 475 cmt. b (1986) ("[A] person will ordinarily be
extradited only in accordance with the conditions set forth in the treaty ... .
27. See supra note 23.
28. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
29. Restatement, supra note 26, § 475 cmt. e.
30. Id.
31. "The complaint must satisfy the requirements of the applicable treaty and relevant legislation, and
these require that it set forth the basic facts upon which it is founded." Bassiouni, supra note 13,
at 662-63.
32. Id.
33. These treaties include either a list of offenses for which extradition will be granted or a formula
that determines if an offense is extraditable. Id. at 393.
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exists to show that the individual committed the charged offenses,
(3) whether the request for extradition meets all the statutory requirements
and the specific requirements of the applicable treaty, and (4) whether to
grant extradition for all, some, or none of the charged offenses.34
If the country decides to grant extradition, it issues an extradition order
that defines the scope of the extradition and details the offenses for which
the country is granting extradition.35 This order must be consistent with the
terms and scope of the extradition treaty. At this point, the surrendering
country gives the receiving country possession of the suspect for
prosecution.
C. The Application of Specialty in Extradition
Any extradition must meet a number of general requirements,36 including
specialty. Specialty, defined in its broadest sense, stands for the proposition
that a receiving state cannot prosecute an extradited individual beyond the
offenses for which he or she was surrendered.37 Specialty is aimed at
preventing the receiving country from violating the trust of the surrendering
country by prosecuting an individual for offenses not made out by the facts
in the extradition request; but, arguably the doctrine also protects the
34. Id. at 703; see also United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (1Ilth Cir. 1995).
35. See Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 656-57.
36. These five requirements are usually written directly into extradition treaties. The United States
considers these requirements "substantive conditions of extradition." Id. at 384. The requirements are
as follows:
(1) Reciprocity-requirement that judicial systems of the requesting and the surrendering states must
have similar procedures and processes. Id at 384-85.
(2) Double criminality-requirement that an accused person may be extradited only for actions that
are considered criminal under the laws of both the surrendering and requesting states. Id. at 388.
(3) Specialty. Id. at 429-36.
(4) Extraditable offenses-requirement that a person can be extradited only if the charged offenses
are enumerated in the treaty as an extraditable offense. Id at 393.
(5) Non-Inquiry-requirement that the surrendering state will not inquire into the means by which the
requesting country aequires evidence of probable cause to make a request for extradition, the method
by which a conviction will be achieved once extradition is granted nor the possible treatment the
extradited individual will receive. Id at 486.
The Pang case is concerned only with the issue of specialty and specifically the interpretation of the
specialty clause in the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty. Pang claimed that his prosecution for murder
would violate his specialty rights under the treaty. He did not claim that any of the other substantive
requirements had been violated. This Note, therefore, does not explore the other four requirements.
37. See iaL at 429.
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extradited individual's rights.38 The vast majority of U.S. extradition treaties
contain express specialty clauses that U.S. courts must respect.
39
Additionally, the doctrine of specialty, if not expressly included, is
impliedly embodied in all extradition treaties.40
1. Justifications for the Application of Specialty in Extradition
The doctrine of specialty is aimed primarily at protecting the sovereignty
of the surrendering state4' by ensuring that once it has turned over an
individual for an offense, the requesting country cannot turn around and
prosecute the extradited individual for a completely unrelated offense.42
Under the doctrine, the surrendering state retains an interest in any
defendant it surrenders for extradition.43 The surrendering state therefore
has power to examine each request for extradition and decide whether the
charged offenses meet the requirements of the applicable extradition
treaty." In addition, the surrendering state controls the scope of the
prosecution, subject to the terms of the applicable treaty, by means of the
extradition order it issues.45 A violation of the doctrine of specialty violates
the surrendering nation's sovereignty.46
2. Implying Specialty into an Extradition Treaty
The U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Rauscher that courts
may imply the doctrine of specialty into an extradition treaty when the
38. See Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Restatement, supra
note 26, § 477 cmt. b ("The doctrine of specialty is designed to prevent prosecution for an offense for
which the person would not have been extradited or to prevent punishment in excess of what the
requested state had reason to believe was contemplated.").
39. Levitt, supra note 14, at 1027-28.
40. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1991).
41. Levitt, supra note 14, at 1025.
42. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 433.
43. Michael Bernard Brenacchi, Standing for the Doctrine of Specialty in Extradition Treaties: A
More Liberal Exposition of Private Rights, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1377, 1398 (1992).
44. See supra Part I.B.
45. If the extradition contains an explicit specialty clause, then the scope of surrendering state's
control over the prosecution is determined by a good faith reading of the clause. See infra Part lI.A.2.
46. The surrendering state is always the intended beneficiary of a specialty clause, so it is always
granted standing to challenge a violation of the clause in the extradition treaty. Bassiouni, supra note
13, at 463. The surrendering nation also has the power to waive the doctrine and allow prosecution for
offenses other than those for which the defendant was originally surrendered. Id. at 434.
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countries have left it out.47 In Rauscher, the United States sought to
extradite William Rauscher, an American officer, from England so he could
stand trial for a charge of murder on the high seas.48 The United States made
a formal request for his extradition under the U.S.-Great Britain extradition
treaty. The treaty neither mentioned the doctrine of specialty nor specified
that the receiving country could only charge an extradited defendant with
crimes in the extradition request or order.49 But, because it listed murder as
an offense for which extradition could be granted, Great Britain granted the
request and extradited Rauscher.5" However, once in the United States,
Rauscher was tried and convicted for cruel and unusual punishment, an
offense neither listed in the extradition treaty nor specified in the request for
extradition.5" Rauscher appealed, arguing that his conviction violated the
extradition treaty that impliedly contained the specialty doctrine. 2
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Rauscher could only be tried for the
offense "with which he [was] charged in the extradition proceedings and for
which he was delivered up," even though the treaty language contained no
such limitation. 3 The Court based its holding on the treaty's history and
terms, the writings of legal experts concerning extradition at the time, and
the principle of comity that governs nations' actions in the absence of
treaties. 4 Under the principle of comity, a country receiving a fugitive from
another country in the absence of a treaty would not prosecute a fugitive for
any offense other than that for which the individual was surrendered.55
Applying this principle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that because the treaty
listed the offenses for which an individual could be extradited, it implicitly
limited a receiving state's ability to prosecute an individual for offenses not
listed in the treaty. 6 Because the parties to the treaty gave no indication that
they would not follow the rules of comity, the Court implied those rules into
the treaty.57 The Court concluded that the treaty contained an implied
47. 119 U.S. 407,419 (1886); see also State v. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d 852,905, 940 P.2d 1293, 1320,
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 628 (1997).





53. Id at 424.





specialty clause and the United States could only prosecute Rauscher for the
offense for which Great Britain surrendered him-murder. 8
The Rauscher decision stands for the proposition that when an
extradition treaty is silent on the issue of specialty, the doctrine will be
implied into the treaty's terms as long as the record indicates that the two
countries that made the treaty would follow the rules of comity in the
absence of a treaty.59 When a court implies the doctrine of specialty into a
treaty, it will impose the strictest version of the doctrine, which allows the
State to prosecute defendants only for the offenses listed in the extradition
order from the surrendering country.'
3. Express Specialty Provisions
All extradition treaties negotiated by the United States over the last 100
years since United States v. Rauscher6" expressly include some form of the
specialty doctrine in their terms.62 The scope of prosecution provided to the
receiving country varies with each treaty.63 Some nations apply the version
of specialty utilized in Rauscher 4 while others utilize a more liberal version
of the doctrine that allows for increased ability of the receiving state to
prosecute individuals for crimes not listed in the extradition order.65
58. Id. at 420.
59. See State v. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d 852, 905, 940 P.2d 1293, 1320, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 628
(1997); see also U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Indeed, one of the
rules embodied in all extradition treaties-either explicitly or implicitly-is the rule of specialty .....
60. See Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 918, 940 P.2d at 1326 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
61. 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (holding that doctrine of specialty applies in all criminal proceedings in
United States and that if extradition treaty does not contain doctrine explicitly within its terms courts
may imply it into treaty's terms).
62. See Levitt, supra note 14, at 1027-28.
63. See Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 917, 940 P.2d at 1327 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
64. Many treaties contain very restrictive specialty clauses that limit the prosecution of extradited
individuals to those crimes specifically listed in the extradition order. These clauses allow the same
scope of prosecution as the specialty clause implied into the treaty in Rauscher. See infra Part I.C.2;
United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that language of U.S.-Chile
extradition treaty only allows extradited defendants to be prosecuted for offenses specified in extradition
order); United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to allow United States
to prosecute defendant for offense not listed in extradition order from Pakistan based on restrictive
language of specialty clause as expressly written into U.S.-Pakistan treaty).
65. The more liberal version of specialty provides the requesting nation with much more control over
the scope of its prosecution of an extradited defendant. This version of specialty allows prosecution for
all crimes and offenses that were made out by the facts in the request for extradition or were specifically
requested in the extradition request. See Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 916-17, 940 P.2d at 1326-27 (Durham,
C.J., dissenting); see also U.S. v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding prosecution of
Vol. 74:191, 1999
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When an extradition treaty contains an explicit specialty provision, its
language determines the scope of prosecution of the extradited individual
by the receiving state.66 The practice of extradition relations through treaties
is limited by a strict interpretation of the applicable treaty in each case.67
Courts must read extradition treaties in good faith when interpreting them.68
A good faith reading of an extradition treaty requires interpreting the
treaty's language according to the plain, ordinary meaning of the words and
their import at the time of the treaty's creation.69 Courts are confined in their
analysis of a treaty's specialty clause to the exact wording of the clause and
must refrain from implying terms into extradition treaties that go beyond the
literal terms of the treaty.7"
II. THE PANG DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On January 5, 1995, an intentionally set fire burned down the Mary Pang
Products warehouse in Seattle and killed four firefighters. 71 Mr. Martin
Shaw Pang, son of the warehouse owners, became the Seattle police's main
suspect in an arson investigation.72 Pang fled to Brazil during the course of
the police investigation, but was nevertheless charged with the crimes of
murder and arson.73 Brazilian authorities later arrested Pang in Brazil.74
defendant for crimes established by facts of request for extradition, but not listed in extradition order
based upon language of specialty clause in treaty that authorized such prosecutions); Restatement, supra
note 26, § 477 cmt. a ("In other states, including the United States, the prosecution may go forward if
it is based on the same facts as those set forth in the request for extradition .... ").
Courts do put certain procedural limitations upon these types of liberal specialty clauses. Courts will
allow the prosecution of defendants for additional offenses other than those listed in the extradition order
only if: (1) the additional offenses that are charged are based upon the same facts as those set forth in
the request for extradition, and (2) the surrendering nation does not and would not view the additional
prosecution as a breach of the terms of the extradition treaty. See United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d
1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
66. Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435 ('We took to the language of the applicable treaty to determine the
protection an extradited person is afforded under the doctrine of specialty.").
67. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 404-05.
68. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309,321 (1907).
69. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 411; see also United States v. Alverez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663
(1992) ("In construing a treaty... we first look to its terms to determine its meaning.").
70. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666 (refising to read extradition treaty between United States and
Mexico to imply protection for individuals who are abducted).




The United States made a formal request for Pang's extradition to
Washington State to face charges for four counts of first degree murder and
one count of first degree arson. 5 The Federal Supreme Court of Brazil
granted extradition for Pang to the United States, but only for the offense
of arson.76 Despite its best efforts, the United States failed to persuade the
Brazilian government to give it permission to prosecute Pang for the four
counts of murder.77
Nonetheless, the Prosecuting Attorney continued to prosecute Pang for
both arson and murder. The King County Superior Court denied Pang's
motion for dismissal or severance of the murder charge.78 The court held
that Brazil implicitly waived its right to object to Pang's prosecution, and
therefore Pang had no standing to challenge any alleged violations of the
treaty.79 The Supreme Court of Washington granted review to determine if
Pang's prosecution violated the extradition treaty.8"
B. The Supreme Court of Washington Found that the Doctrine of
Specialty Barred Prosecution
The Supreme Court of Washington overturned the King County Superior
Court's decision, and held that the doctrine of specialty prevented
prosecutors from trying Pang for murder.8' The court opened its analysis by
finding that Pang had standing to challenge his prosecution for murder as
a violation of his rights under the terms of the extradition treaty.82 The court
then reviewed the limitations Brazil could place on Pang's prosecution
pursuant to the treaty terms.8 3
74. Id. at 868, 940 P.2d at 1302.
75. Id. at 856-59, 940 P.2d at 1295.
76. Id. at 873, 940 P.2d at 1304. The court held that under the Brazilian Penal Code the offenses of
arson and first degree murder corresponded only to the single crime of aggravated arson. Id. The impact
of the order was that Washington would not be able to try Pang for murder because in Washington the
only way to punish the arsonist for deaths resulting from the fire is to charge him with the crime of first
degree murder. Id. at 876, 940 P.2d at 1305-06.
77. Id. at 875, 940 P.2d at 1305.
78. Id. at 890, 940 P.2d at 1312-13.
79. Id.; see also supra note 46.
80. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 893, 940 P.2d at 1314.
81. Id. at 915, 940 P.2d at 1325.
82. Id. at 896-902, 940 P.2d at 1316-18.
83. Id. at 905-06, 940 P.2d at 1321.
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The court defined the specialty doctrine as a limit placed on the ability
of a receiving country to prosecute an extradited individual for any crimes
other than the ones for which surrender was made.84 Basing its definition of
specialty on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Rauscher,"5 the Supreme Court of Washington noted that the Rauscher
Court implied the doctrine of specialty into the treaty because the treaty in
question was silent on that issue.86 The court interpreted Rauscher to require
that the doctrine of specialty be implied into the U.S.-Brazil extradition
treaty at issue in the Pang case.87
The court noted that Article XXI of the U.S.-Brazil treaty directly
incorporates the doctrine of specialty into the treaty.8 That clause states that
"[a] person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be tried or
punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior
to the request for extradition, other than that which gave rise to the
request." 9 Despite this express specialty clause, the court concluded that
Rauscher still applied; therefore, the State's ability to prosecute Pang was
limited to arson, the crime for which Brazil extradited him." The majority
based its decision on two Ninth Circuit cases that, according to the court,
held that Rauscher requires that the doctrine of specialty be implied into all
extradition treaties, even those with express specialty clauses.9'
Turning to the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty at issue, the court cited
United States v. Khan92 for the proposition that Pang could not be
prosecuted for a crime not listed in the request for extradition.93 The court
in Khan disallowed the prosecution of an extradited defendant for crimes
not specifically listed in the Pakistani extradition order.94 The decision in
Khan is based on the specific language of the extradition treaty involved,
84. Id. at 902, 940 P.2d at 1318.
85. 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (holding that doctrine of specialty applies in all criminal proceedings in
United States and that if extradition treaty does not contain doctrine explicitly within its terms, courts
may imply it into treaty's terms).
86. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 905, 940 P.2d at 1320.
87. Id at 907, 940 P.2d at 1321.
88. Id at 906, 940 P.2d at 1320.
89. Id. at 911, 940 P.2d at 1322 (quoting Treaty of Extradition, supra note 18, art. XXI).
90. Id. at 907-08, 940 P.2d at 1320-21; see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840,845 (9th Cir.
1996); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1991).
91. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 907,940 P.2d at 1321.
92. 993 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 913, 940 P.2d at 1324.
94. Id.
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which limited prosecution to crimes for which Pakistan had specifically
agreed to extradite a party.95 Based on the language of the specialty clause
in the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty and the fact that all extradition treaties
contain an implicit level of specialty protection equal to that granted in
Rauscher, the majority concluded that Washington could not prosecute
Pang for any crime other than arson.96
C. The Dissent Argued that the Doctrine of Specialty Must Be Applied
According to the Treaty
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Durham argued that the
prosecution of Pang for both murder and arson was well within the terms
of the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty. Finding that there are varying levels
of specialty protection that differ from treaty to treaty, the dissent opined
that a court must look to each individual treaty's specific language to
understand the exact scope of permissible prosecution.97
The dissent argued that the majority's misreading of Rauscher led it to
misapply the doctrine of specialty in the Pang case.9 8 The majority
conceded that the strict version of specialty implied into the treaty in
Rauscher was due to the fact that the treaty contained no specialty clause
in its body. 9 The dissent noted that the court in Rauscher was careful to
state that its holding was limited to treaties that fail to provide an express
specialty clause.' Based on Rauscher and subsequent cases applying its
holding, the dissent concluded that if a specialty clause is written into the
treaty's terms, then a court is bound by those terms alone and Rauscher is
inapplicable.' °'
Turning its attention to the exact language of the U.S.-Brazil extradition
treaty, the dissent noted that the U.S.-Brazil treaty contained an express
specialty clause and that Rauscher was therefore inapplicable to the Pang
case.02 Because the treaty contained an express specialty clause, the dissent
95. Id.
96. Id. at 913-14, 940 P.2d at 1324.
97. Id. at 916-17, 940 P.2d at 1326 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 921-22, 940 P.2d at 1328-29 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 923, 940 P.2d at 1329 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 924-25, 940 P.2d at 1330 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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held that the scope of Pang's prosecution should be defined solely by the
treaty's terms."°3
Lastly, the dissent stated that the plain meaning of the U.S.-Brazil
treaty's specialty clause allowed prosecution of extradited defendants for
any offenses "which gave rise to the request."'" The State requested
extradition of Pang for both arson and first degree murder and presented
facts sufficient in the extradition request to make out both charges. Thus,
prosecuting Pang for murder would not violate the extradition treaty."5
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON MISAPPLIED
THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIALTY IN THE PANG CASE
State v. Pang presented the Supreme Court of Washington with its first
opportunity to interpret the terms of an extradition treaty. Unfortunately, the
court wrongly decided the case by misunderstanding and misapplying the
specialty doctrine. The court incorrectly used a non-literal interpretation of
the U.S.-Brazil treaty based on its faulty application of the law surrounding
the specialty doctrine. The court also failed to consider the policy reasons
underlying the specialty doctrine, all of which suggest that Pang's situation
did not warrant the protection of specialty. Rather than imply additional
terms, the supreme court should have confined its analysis of the case to the
plain language of the treaty and allowed the State to prosecute Pang for four
counts of murder.
A. The Supreme Court of Washington Should Have Interpreted the
U S.-Brazil Extradition Treaty Literally
1. The State Supreme Court Failed to Read the Treaty Literally
The language of the extradition treaty in this case is straightforward: "A
person extradited by virtue of the present Treaty may not be tried or
punished by the requesting State for any crime or offense committed prior
to the request for his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the
request... .,,106 Read literally, any offense the requesting country included
in the request for extradition could be prosecuted. However, instead of
restricting itself to this literal interpretation of the clause, the Supreme Court
103. Id. (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 925, 940 P.2d at 1330 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 930,940 P.2d at 1332 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
106. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 18, art. XXI (emphasis added).
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of Washington implied additional terms into the treaty. 107 The majority read
the clause as implicitly requiring that an extradited defendant cannot be
prosecuted for crimes not specifically included in the extradition order from
the surrendering country.' Yet, nowhere does the treaty state, either
explicitly or implicitly, that the parties intended to limit the receiving
country's ability to prosecute individuals solely to the crimes listed in the
extradition order. The only limitation imposed by the treaty itself is that the
offenses prosecuted must be made out in the request for extradition by the
requesting country.
2. The State Supreme Court's Non-Literal Reading of the Extradition
Treaty Violated Established Rules of Treaty Interpretation
The non-literal reading of the treaty by the majority goes against the
rules of treaty interpretation. The general rule in the realm of extradition
relations is that all treaties must be read strictly according to their terms."
Extradition treaties must be read in "good faith," and courts must not apply
questionable interpretations to extradition treaties that will allow the
prosecution of an extradited defendant for crimes other than those for which
the defendant was surrendered."' The court failed to acknowledge that
Washington was applying a "good faith" reading of the treaty by seeking
to prosecute Pang for murder. The treaty's language would have allowed
the prosecution of Pang for murder. Instead of abiding by the treaty's clear
terms, the court proceeded to imply additional terms into the treaty. The
basis for this majority decision was its overly broad reading of Rauscher.
The majority itself admitted that the doctrine of specialty was expressly
incorporated into the terms of the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty."' Because
the treaty contains a specialty clause, the court's analysis of the scope of
prosecution allowed under the treaty should have focused exclusively on an
analysis of the treaty's terms." 2 The U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty clearly
states that the only limitation on the prosecution of an extradited defendant
107. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 914-15, 940 P.2d at 1325.
108. Id.
109. See Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 404-05.
110. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907).
111. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 906, 940 P.2d at 1321 ("In this case, the doctrine of specialty is
incorporated into the terms of the Treaty .... ).
112. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ("[T]o determine the nature and extent
of the right we must look to the treaty which created it."); see also United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d
1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
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is that all the prosecuted offenses must arise out of the same facts "which
gave rise to the request" for extradition."1 In the Pang case, all of the
offenses surround the fire that Pang allegedly started at the warehouse. The
State made a request to extradite Pang for both crimes."4 This fits within the
parameters of the specialty clause in the treaty.
3. The Supreme Court of Washington Grossly Misread Rauscher
The court based its holding in Pang on a flawed reading of the Rauscher
decision. The majority correctly looked to Rauscher as the starting point for
an analysis of specialty in U.S. extradition law,"5 but it read the case too
broadly. As the Pang majority noted, the Rauscher Court implied a version
of specialty into an extradition treaty that was silent on the issue."6 The
version of specialty applied in Rauscher limited all prosecution of
extradited defendants by the receiving country to the offenses for which the
defendant was specifically surrendered." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly limited its holding in Rauscher to the extradition treaty in that
case," 8 and based its decision to imply a strict version of the doctrine on the
facts of the case-namely, that the parties to the treaty abided by the rules
of comity." 9 The U.S. Supreme Court implied the specialty clause only
because the treaty contained no express terms to determine the intended
scope of prosecution of extradited defendants.
20
The court's interpretation of Rauscher virtually demands that all
extradition treaties conform to the version of specialty that was implied into
113. Treaty ofExtradition, supra note 18, art. XXI.
114. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 859, 940 P.2d at 1297.
115. Since the Rauscher decision, the United States has routinely incorporated specialty clauses into
all of the extradition treaties it has entered. See Christopher J. Morivillo, Individual Rights and the
Doctrine ofSpecialty: The Deterioration of United States v. Rauscher, 14 Fordham Int'l L. 987, 1000
(1991).
116. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 905,940 P.2d at 1320.
117. Id. at 903, 940 P.2d at 1319.
118. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,429 (1886) ("The right of one government to demand
and receive from another the custody of an offender... depends upon the existence of treaty stipulations
between them and in all cases is derived from and is measured and restricted by, the provisions, express
or implied, of the treaty.").
119. Comity is the set of rules by which countries abide when receiving fugitives from other countries
without extradition treaties. One of the rules of comity is that the receiving country cannot prosecute an
individual for any offense other than one for which he was surrendered. See supra Part LC.2.
120. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 429.
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the Rauscher extradition treaty. 2 ' This reading forces all treaties,
irrespective of the explicit treaty language, to limit impliedly the offenses
for which an extradited defendant can be prosecuted to those specified in
the extradition order.'22 Rauscher does not support this broad reading.'23
4. The Pang Decision Contradicts the Weight ofAuthority
Other courts applying Rauscher have adopted a much narrower reading
of the case's holding. The Pang court's decision to ignore the express
language of the treaty and imply additional limitations in the treaty
contradicts the great weight of authority from other courts across the
country. 1
24
The vast majority of courts that have examined express specialty clauses
in treaties have confined their analysis to the language of the treaty instead
of implying additional levels of protection into the treaty.125 Rauscher and
its strict version of specialty do not govern the scope of the prosecution;
instead, it is the "language of the applicable treaty' 126 that determines the
protection accorded to an extradited person. The Pang majority itself cites
two U.S. Court of Appeals cases that directly contradict its own holding.'
27
These two cases demonstrate the result the majority should have reached.
In Fiocconi v. Attorney General128 and United States v. Sensi,129 the courts
121. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 905, 940 P.2d at 1320.
122. Id.
123. In fact, the two Ninth Circuit cases cited by the majority fail to support such a broad reading.
Neither United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) nor United States v.
Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1996) supports the majority's proposition that all extradition treaties
contain an implicit specialty clause limiting prosecution to only the offenses for which individuals were
surrendered. In fact, the holding in Baramdyka contradicts the majority's position; the court stopped the
prosecution of an extradited individual for crimes not listed in the extradition agreement based on the
plain language of the extradition treaty at issue in the case, not on an implied version of specialty.
Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 845.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Andonian, 29 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Riviere, 924
F.2d 1289 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v.
Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.
1986).
125. See, e.g., Baramydka, 95 F.3d at 845; United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575 (1 lth Cir.
1995); Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435; United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1373 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1990); Sensi, 879 F.2d at 895.
126. See Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435.
127. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 912-13,940 P.2d at 1324.
128. 462 F.2d475.
129. 879 F.2d 888.
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allowed the government to prosecute extradited defendants for offenses for
which the defendants were not specifically surrendered in the extradition
orders. 130
Both cases involved extradition treaties with explicit specialty clauses
incorporated into their terms.' In each case the court allowed prosecution
of defendants based on the expansive language of the applicable treaty.3
The court in Fiocconi, by allowing the defendants to be prosecuted for
crimes not listed in the extradition order, expressly rejected the contention
that Rauscher requires courts to imply greater levels of protection to
extradited defendants beyond the express treaty language.'33 Instead, the
court noted that if a country wants to ensure that defendants are not
prosecuted for offenses other than those listed in the extradition order, it
must expressly place that restriction into the treaty; otherwise, such
prosecutions can occur.
131
The defendant in Sensi was also convicted for charges other than those
for which he was extradited.135 The court upheld these convictions based
upon the treaty language, which allowed prosecution of all offenses
"established by the facts in respect of which his extradition has been
granted.', 136 The crimes of which the defendant was convicted in Sensi were
not listed in the extradition order, but were based on the same facts as those
crimes for which extradition was granted. 37 The court therefore held that
the conviction complied with the version of specialty that existed in that
treaty.
38
Following this logic, Pang's prosecution for murder did not violate the
specialty doctrine in the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty. The treaty clearly
130. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 912, 940 P.2d at 1323.
131. The specialty clause in the Fiocconi stated that "the person... delivered up for the crimes
enumerated... shall in no case be tried for any... crime, committed previously to that for which
his... surrender is asked." Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Extradition
Convention, Sept. 15, 1868, U.S.-It., art. Ill, 15 Stat. 631). The specialty clause in Sensi stated that "[a]
person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against... for any offense other than an
extraditable offense established by the facts in respect of which his extradition has been granted... "
United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-
U.K., art. XII, 28 U.S.T. 227,233).
132. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 926,940 P.2d at 1331.
133. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 480-81.
134. Id at481.
135. United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 895-96.
138. IaM
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states that the only limitation on the prosecution of an extradited individual
is that the prosecuted offenses be those that gave rise to the request for
extradition. 39 Based upon the reasoning of Sensi and Fiocconi, a court is
bound to follow the express treaty language in determining the scope of
prosecution permitted by the treaty. The State of Washington made a
request of extradition for murder and arson. That is all that is required to
meet the treaty's terms. Therefore, a court enforcing the treaty should have
allowed Washington to prosecute Pang for both crimes.
The treaty's language is the first place a court must look to determine the
parties' intent. The parties to an extradition treaty may choose whichever
version of specialty best suits their needs: (1) the strictest version of
specialty-the version first introduced in Rauscher that allows prosecution
only for offenses for which surrender was specifically granted; or (2) a less
restrictive version, as in the treaties interpreted in Fiocconi and Sensi, that
allows the requesting nation to control the scope of prosecution in its
request for extradition. 40 The United States and Brazil placed the latter
version into their extradition treaty.'
4'
It is improper for the Supreme Court of Washington to step in twenty-
five years after the treaty was signed and decide to read into the treaty more
restrictive terms. The role of the court is simply to interpret the "plain
meaning of the words" of the treaty. 42 By refusing to read the treaty
according to its plain meaning, the Pang court thwarted the stated intention
of the parties to the treaty and prevented Washington from prosecuting an
individual for the deaths allegedly caused by his intentional actions. The
treaty granted Washington the power to prosecute Pang for all crimes that
made up its request for extradition. Thus, the court should have allowed
Washington to continue to prosecute Pang for the murder charges.
B. Policy Justifications Mandate that Washington Prosecute Pang
for Murder
Two policy justifications underlie the specialty doctrine: preserving the
surrendering state's sovereignty, and protecting an individual's right not to
139. See supra note 18.
140. The requesting nation maintains control because it can prosecute the defendant for whatever
crimes it is legitimately able to make out in the request for extradition. Once extradition is granted, the
prosecution of the defendant is in the requesting nation's hands subject to the limitation that all crimes
charged must have been made out in the request for extradition.
141. See supra Part U.B.
142. Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 411.
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be charged with unrelated offenses after surrender.43 Neither of these
policies would have been threatened if Pang had been prosecuted for
murder. First, the sovereign rights of Brazil, preserved through the terms of
the treaty, would not have been violated because the prosecution was valid
under the literal terms of the treaty. The U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty
explicitly contains a specialty clause that grants the requesting nation broad
powers over the scope of prosecution. " Second, the policy of protecting an
individual from being tried by the receiving country for completely
unrelated and possibly false charges after that individual has been extradited
for a valid offense was not in jeopardy.45 Washington was merely trying to
prosecute Pang to the full extent of his crime. Both the fire and the resulting
deaths sprang from Pang's single act of arson. Pang should not have
received additional protection from prosecution based solely on the fact that
he chose Brazil as his destination when fleeing from U.S. authorities.
1. Prosecuting Pang for Murder Would Not Have Violated Brazil's
Sovereignty
The prosecution of Pang for murder would not have violated Brazil's
sovereignty because it was authorized under the express terms of the treaty.
Brazil, along with the United States, chose the language of the specialty
clause incorporated into the extradition treaty. Pang's prosecution would
not have violated the treaty's terms. In addition, Washington was not
seeking to abuse Brazil's sovereignty by prosecuting Pang for a crime that
was completely unrelated to the one for which Washington requested he be
surrendered. Therefore, Brazil had no ground on which to object to Pang's
valid prosecution under the treaty's terms, and no violation of its
sovereignty would have occurred.
Both parties knew, or reasonably should have known, that the specialty
clause language included in the treaty allowed an extradited individual to
be prosecuted for all offenses made out in the request for extradition. 46 The
treaty language put Brazil on notice that Pang could be prosecuted for the
crime of murder in the first degree because it was one of the two offenses
143. See supra Part LC.I; see also Restatement, supra note 26, § 477 cmt. b.
144. State v. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d 852, 918, 925, 940 P.2d 1293, 1326-27 (Durham, CJ., dissenting),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 628 (1997).
145. See Restatement, supra note 26, § 477 cmt. b.
146. See supra note 18.
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for which Washington sought extradition in its request.'47 The State listed
all of the facts surrounding the crime and the reasons why it sought to
prosecute Pang for both murder and arson. 4 Brazil knew that Washington
was requesting extradition for both murder and arson. In fact, the
government of Brazil clearly stated that it had no objection to having Pang
punished for the full extent of his actions, as long as the terms of the treaty
were honored.'49 Pang's prosecution for murder fell within the scope of the
treaty's specialty clause that allowed prosecution for all offenses "which
gave rise to the request"' 5" for extradition. No violation of Brazil's
sovereignty under the treaty would have occurred had the prosecution been
allowed to move forward.
Because both charges against Pang arose out of the same set of facts,
prosecuting Pang for murder would not have violated the central purpose
of specialty: to protect the sovereignty of the surrendering country by
stopping the indiscriminate prosecution of an individual for crimes separate
and unrelated to the extradition request. 5 ' Washington sought to prosecute
Pang for offenses that arose out of the fact that he intentionally set a
warehouse on fire. 5 The mere fact that two countries do not give a crime
the same name is not relevant to the issue of specialty.'53 The only question
is whether the defendant's underlying actions are considered criminal in
both jurisdictions.'54 In both the United States and Brazil, an intentionally
set fire that results in death is a criminal act and is punished more severely
than arson that results only in property damage.'55 Brazil was not tricked
147. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 868, 940 P.2d at 1301; see also United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 895
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty language, which expressly allowed
prosecution for additional crimes made out by facts that served as basis for extradition, put United
Kingdom on notice that such prosecutions could occur and that it had no grounds to object).
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. The Brazilian Minister of Justice wrote to Attorney General Reno stating:
[P]rovided that the terms of the Treaty of Extradition between Brazil and the United States of
America of January 13, 1961, are respected it will be incumbent upon the justice system of the
United States of America to establish a suitable punishment for the crime of arson in the first
degree, resulting in the deaths and the consequences thereof, under U.S. law.
Letter from Nelson A. Jobim, Minister of State for Justice of Brazil, to Janet Reno, United States
Attorney General (Sept. 26, 1996) (English translation from original Portuguese).
150. See supra note 18.
151. See supra Part I.B.1.
152. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 930, 940 P.2d at 1333 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
153. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922).
154. Id.
155. Pang, 132 Wash. 2d at 930, 940 P.2d at 1333.
Vol. 74:191, 1999
Specialty Doctrine
into surrendering Pang for the arson charge only to find out later that
Washington was trying him for a completely unrelated crime. Washington
was merely seeking to punish Pang for the full extent of his criminal
actions.
2. Prosecuting Pang Would Not Have Violated His Interests Under
the Treaty
The secondary concern of the doctrine of specialty is to protect the
interests of the extradited individual. 56 The doctrine prevents a country
from prosecuting an individual for crimes unrelated to those stated in the
extradition request and prevents punishment of a defendant beyond what the
surrendering nation could have expected when it allowed the extradition.'57
Washington's prosecution of Pang for murder would not have violated
Pang's interests. Pang did not need specialty's protection. He was lucky
enough to have landed in a country that labels arson resulting in the loss of
human life as one crime instead of two.' This difference in Brazil's justice
system as compared to Washington's is not the type of situation that
specialty is intended to protect.'59 Pang did not have a right to hide behind
the shield of specialty in this case.
156. The view that the individual is also a direct beneficiary of the doctrine of specialty and can
invoke its protection is not a universal one in the U.S. judicial system. The Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits all follow the view that an extradited individual has standing, separate from the
surrendering country, to challenge his or her prosecution as a violation of his or her treaty rights. See
Bemacchi, supra note 43, at 1388-40; see also Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 464-74.
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits all have denied individuals standing to challenge a
violation of the doctrine of specialty. These courts have held that extradition treaties and specialty serve
only to protect the interests of the surrendering state's sovereignty. See Bassiouni, supra note 13, at
474-76; see also Restatement, supra note 26, § 477 cmt. b (CBoth the person extradited and extraditing
country are beneficiaries of the doctrine."); Bemacchi, supra note 43, at 1398-1400.
157. See Restatement, supra note 26, § 477 cmt. b.
158. There is no indication in the record of the case, nor in any of the outside coverage of the case,
that Pang fled to Brazil because of its legal system. This is not a case of a defendant choosing to flee to
a specific country based on its favorable system of laws. Instead, all indications are that Pang fled to
Brazil for no specific reason and was "lucky" enough to have chosen a destination that happened to have
arson and aggravated arson in its criminal code.
159. "The 'principle of specialty' reflects a fundamental concern of governments that persons who
are surrendered should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government,
especially political crimes." Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen., 462 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 1972).
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3. Prosecuting Pang for Murder Would Have Furthered the Policies
Underlying Extradition
The Supreme Court of Washington's decision to prevent the State from
prosecuting Pang for murder served only to protect a suspected arsonist
from standing trial for the full extent of his actions. The purpose of
extradition treaties is to help facilitate the capture of fugitives who flee a
country's jurisdiction."6 The terms of the treaty set up the ground rules that
the parties to the treaty agree to follow when extraditing an individual. The
goal of the U.S.-Brazil extradition treaty, as with all such treaties, is to help
ensure that no crimes go unpunished and that countries aid each other in this
goal.' 6' The court's decision in Pang overrode the explicit terms of the
treaty and prevented Washington from prosecuting Pang for the full extent
of his alleged crimes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Washington grossly misapplied the doctrine of
specialty in the Pang case. The court's overly broad reading of Rauscher
led it to imply improperly additional terms into the treaty, preventing the
State from prosecuting Pang for murder. The majority looked past the plain
language of the treaty, which would have allowed the prosecution of Pang
for both murder and arson, to reach its conclusion. The court should have
constrained itself to the language of the treaty and not implied additional
terms. Neither Brazil's sovereign rights nor Pang's rights under the treaty
needed the protection given by the Pang decision. Prosecuting Pang for
both murder and arson would not have violated the extradition treaty and
the court should have allowed it.
162
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of Specialty: An
Examination of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1187,
1192 (1995).
162. The saga of Martin Pang recently concluded. Pang agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge of
four counts of first degree manslaughter. The judge in the case, Superior Court Judge Larry Jordan,
imposed a sentence of 35 years. Pang has agreed not to appeal this sentence. Even in light of this
sentence, many members of the families of the killed firefighters feel Pang should have been tried and
punished for the crime of murder. Steve Miletich, Tears and Bitterness at Pang's Sentencing, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 24, 1998, at Al.
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